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The objective of this study is to investigate the long-run performance of initial public offerings 
(IPO) in Germany for the period from 1977 to 1995. Of particular interest is to examine 
whether underpricing and the timing of subsequent seasoned equity offerings (SEO) may help 
to explain why some firms have substantial positive and others have substantial negative long-
run abnormal holding period returns after going public. We find significant empirical evidence 
that firms that raised additional funds after an IPO through a seasoned equity offering 
outperformed the market. There is a significant difference in returns relative to the firms that 
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had no subsequent equity offering. A comparison of seasoned equity offerings of IPOs and of 
established firms suggests that the information asymmetry is more pronounced for IPO firms. 
 
I. Introduction 
 The decision of many companies to go public and the short- and long-run performance 
of newly issued equities have been of significant interest to investors and academics alike. This 
interest may be related to the importance of Initial Public Offerings (IPO) for economic growth 
and employment. More importantly, however, the specific return behavior or “market 
anomalies” of IPOs created, on the one hand, immense profit opportunities for investors and, 
on the other hand, tremendous risks. Consequently, a large number of theoretical explanations 
have been developed and many empirical studies conducted to explain this phenomenon. In 
particular, empirical research has investigated the underpricing and long-run performance of 
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in the United States and in other countries (Loughran and Ritter, 
1995). As a result, a relatively consistent pattern of underpricing, initial returns, and long-run 
performance of IPOs has emerged. For most countries these studies find significant 
underpricing in the primary market and consequently substantial initial returns in the secondary 
market. In contrast to the almost certain short-run outperformance of IPOs there is, on average, 
a substantial underperformance over longer periods.  
 For the German capital market there have been a number of empirical studies that 
analyze the underpricing and long-run performance of initial public offerings (Stehle and 
Ehrhardt, 1999; Ljungqvist, 1997; Stehle et al., 2000; Thies, 2000; Kurth, 2005; Bessler and 
Kurth 2007; Bessler and Thies, 2007). These studies, however, provide some conflicting results 
such as huge spreads in underpricing within analyzed periods as well as long-run 
underperformance and neutral performance dependent on the benchmark used so that a number 
of open issues remain and await empirical explanations. The objective of this study is to add to 
our understanding of the return behavior of initial public offerings by investigating the long-run 
performance of IPOs in Germany for the period from 1977 to 1995. The focus of this study is 
on the impact that seasoned equity offering (SEOs) have on the long-run performance of IPOs.  
 The IPO market in Germany is of special interest for a number of reasons. First of all, 
the banking system, the legal system, as well as the corporate governance structure are viewed 
as different from that of the United States so that some different results may be expected. In 
fact, some earlier empirical studies for seasoned equity offerings report opposite empirical 
results for Germany than usually found in studies for the United States. Smith (1986), for 
example, documents positive abnormal returns for the announcement period of SEOs in the 
U.S., while Brakmann (1993) and Padberg (1995) report positive announcement returns for 
SEOs in Germany. Secondly, the number of companies that went public in Germany and the 
amount of equity that was raised through an initial public offering was relatively minor 
compared to that of the United States and some other countries despite the size of the German 
economy. Hence, we may expect some different results. Moreover, most of the firms that went 
public up to 1995 were not high-tech start-up companies but often were already established 
firms with an average age well above 20 years (Ljungqvist, 1997). These firms may be easier to 
value, again resulting in different empirical findings.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section the literature for IPOs 
is reviewed with an emphasis on underpricing and long-run performance. The methodology and 
data are explained in section 3. The empirical results are presented in section 4. These results 
are separated into sensitivity to the benchmark, influence of the underpricing, performance of 
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IPOs, impact of seasoned equity offerings as well as a comparison of subsequent financing 
decisions of IPOs and established firms. The last section concludes the paper. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 Beginning with the seminal paper of Modigliani and Miller (1958) there is an enormous 
amount of literature that deals with financing decisions and financing behavior of firms. The 
pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984), the cash flow shortfall theory (Miller and 
Rock, 1985), and the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) are among the most dominant 
theories. They all base their arguments on information asymmetry and agency problems. In 
these models it is assumed that management has an information advantage over investors. 
Financing decisions are therefore viewed by the market as a reliable signal about the firm’s 
quality. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that financing decisions reveal information to the 
market because the decision to issue equity signals that the firm is overvalued. Consequently, 
issuing equity should result in negative valuation effects at the announcement date (short-run). 
Miller and Rock (1985) argue that management has an information advantage with respect to 
the firm’s expected cash flows. Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis is based on agency 
problems that result from the fact that management prefers to maximize its own utility. 
According to this theory, managers may use the free cash flow to invest in negative net present 
value projects and therefore do not maximize shareholder value. Consequently, the market has 
to evaluate whether the cash flows are properly invested or wasted at the announcement of a 
financing decision. 
 
 A. Underpricing of IPOs 
When firms raise equity in the public market with an IPO for the first time the issues 
become even more complex. It is necessary to develop extended models in order to explain the 
financing behavior and valuation effects when firms go public because IPOs differ from 
publicly traded firms. With respect to IPOs three predominant phenomena have been observed 
empirically and are extensively discussed in the literature: “underpricing” (Ibbotson et al., 
1988), “hot issue markets” (Ritter, 1984), and “long-run underperformance” (Ritter, 1991).  
Most of the earlier models developed and tested are related to underpricing. In addition 
to the equilibrium models that are based on information asymmetry there is although a number 
of models that are either based on institutional factors or that can be classified as ad-hoc-
approaches (Ritter, 1991). Especially the ad-hoc-models are suited to explain market behavior 
such as overreaction that should be corrected in the long-run. The empirical evidence of the 
long-run underperformance underscores the relevance of models that explain the relationship 
between financing decisions and information effects (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Jensen, 1986). 
These models are discussed in the next section. 
In equilibrium models that are based on information asymmetry underpricing is 
explained in different ways. In the adverse-selection-models there exists information 
asymmetry within the group of investors (Rock, 1986; Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Carter and 
Manaster, 1990). In principal-agent-models the investment bank possesses superior information 
relative to the issuing firm or the investor (Baron, 1982). In contrast, the signaling-models 
assume that the issuing firm has better information than the investment bank or the investor 
(Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Welch, 1989; Schenone, 2004; Brau 
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and Fawcett, 2006). In order to reduce the information risk of being less informed, all these 
models suggest that underpricing is one solution to this information asymmetry problem.  
 The models that focus on institutional factors can be classified according to the 
hypotheses that they raise. This yields the legal insurance or monopoly hypothesis (Logue, 
1973), the lawsuit-avoidance- or legal-liability-hypothesis (Tinic, 1988), the pre-sale-
information-gathering-hypothesis (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989), the incomplete-spanning-
hypothesis (Mauer and Senbet, 1992) as well as the cascade model (Welch, 1992) and models 
that explain price support (Ruud, 1993). Although these are important approaches to offer 
explanations of underpricing, they are not well suited to explain long-run underperformance. 
 Thus, these models are less important for the problems discussed in this research. 
The general idea of the ad hoc approaches is that they explain underpricing with the behavior 
and expectations of the investor. Among the most dominant theories is the divergence-of-
opinion-hypothesis, which explains long-run underperformance as a reduction of heterogeneous 
expectations and information uncertainty (Miller, 1977; Michael and Shaw, 1994), the 
impresario-hypothesis that explains overreaction and fads (Shiller, 1990; Aggarwal and Rivoli, 
1990), as well as the windows-of-opportunity-hypothesis, which proposes that the higher 
ex-ante-uncertainty in hot- issue-periods justifies a higher underpricing (Ritter, 1991; Bayless 
and Chaplinsky, 1996).  
 These models are intuitively appealing but often they are not in accordance with the 
assumed rational behavior of investors. Nevertheless, testable hypotheses can be derived to 
investigate the long-run performance of IPOs. One of the testable features of the impresario-
hypothesis, for example, is that the IPOs with the highest underpricing will have a long-run 
underperformance after going public. This issue is addressed in our empirical analysis later on. 
After reviewing the various approaches documented in the literature, it appears that signaling 
models are best suited for the objective of this study. These models assume that managers have 
information advantages with respect to the fair value of the firm. They strive to maximize their 
own utility, for example, by maximizing the cash flows from issuing equity. Moreover, 
managers of high quality firms have an incentive to reveal the fair value of the firm to the 
market through signaling, because investors usually do not have the ability to discriminate 
between good and bad firms. Obviously, the quality has to be signaled before the transaction 
take place. In these explanations underpricing is viewed as one signal together with the 
retention of shares (Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989), earnings and dividend policy after the IPO 
(Allen and Faulhaber, 1989) as well as the volume and timing of subsequent financing 
decisions (Welch, 1989; Welch, 1996). 
 Welch (1989), for example, argues that the higher quality firms can signal their quality 
to the market through the magnitude of the underpricing and through the retention of shares by 
the owners. A separating equilibrium is attainable because only the higher quality firms will 
achieve a higher market value over time and therefore have an incentive to signal. The higher 
issuing costs, due to the underpricing at the time of the IPO, should be compensated for by the 
higher issuing price that seems to be obtainable in the first (FSEO) and in subsequent seasoned 
equity offerings (SSEO). Welch (1989) observes that the issuing prices at the first seasoned 
equity offering after the IPO are three times higher than the initial offering price at the time of 
the IPO. Moreover, there are apparently clusters of FSEOs within the first three years after 
going public (Welch 1989).   
 In contrast, Gale and Stiglitz (1989) argue that in a pooling equilibrium the investor 
cannot distinguish ex ante between good and bad IPOs. They agree, however, that the 
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percentage of shares retained by the owner could signal the quality of the firm. This implies 
that there is no relationship between characteristics of the IPO such as percentage of 
“secondary shares” and the stock price reaction at the time of the FSEO. Slovin et al. (1991, p. 
637) point out that “the firm’s return to the equity market is a prima facie signal of unfavorable 
private information about project quality.” Summarizing this research leads to the following 
conclusions: It can be expected that firms with a higher underpricing have higher earnings and 
will start to pay dividends sooner. There is also a higher probability that these IPOs will have a 
seasoned equity offering, that they will issue a larger amount of equity and that the stock price 
reaction at the time of a SEO will be smaller (Michaely and Shaw, 1994).  
 Such a complex decision making environment and such a complex financing behavior 
should be difficult to disentangle. The approach taken in this study is to gain additional insights 
into the financing and valuation effects by analyzing the long-run performance of IPOs and the 
impact of subsequent financing decisions after the IPO. If a firm, for example, plans to return to 
the equity market to raise additional funds it is most likely in the best interest of that firm to 
signal reliably the quality of the firm as early as possible (Slovin et al., 1991). Jegadeesh et al. 
(1993) and Garfinkel (1993) assume in their studies that there exists a relationship between the 
stock price performance of the first days after the IPO and the amount and timing of the FSEO. 
When the time period between the IPO and the FSEO is extended, then the probability 
increases that more positive or negative information about the firm will become available. 
Thus, it can be expected that managers view the prospects of the firm in general more 
unfavorably the earlier they decide to return to the capital market. Consequently, the negative 
signal of the announcement is more pronounced the sooner the firm returns to the market for a 
first seasoned equity offering.  
 Empirical studies for the U.S. market find some evidence that some firms issue 
additional equity (FSEO) in a relatively short time period after the IPO (Welch, 1989). It 
should be noted, however, that the percentage of IPOs with subsequent seasoned equity 
offerings is only 25% in the U.S. In contrast, the relative number for IPOs with FSEOs in 
Germany is much higher with about 50% for the period from 1977 to 1995. The relatively 
much smaller number for the U.S. supports the observations that for some U.S. firms the IPO is 
the only time in the firm’s history at which they issue equity publicly. James (1992) 
investigates the financing behavior of IPOs with respect to other financing instruments and 
finds that these firms do hardly return to the financial markets within the first eight years after 
the IPO. Because only 3.5% of the IPOs return to the equity market twice and only 1% of the 
IPOs return three times it can be assumed that the poor quality of the firms excludes them from 
raising additional equity. Welch (1989) supports this view in that he also finds for the first 10 
years after the IPO that the public financing activities of these firms diminish over time. Welch 
(1989) reports that the total proceeds start to decline about two years after the IPO and level off 
after about six years. This all suggests that firms that plan to return to the equity market will try 
to offer additional equity as soon as possible after the going public. 
 
 A. Long-run Underperformance 
In addition to the intensively studied issue of IPO underpricing and the positive first day initial 
returns there exist a large number of studies that empirically investigate the long-run 
performance of initial public offerings. Following the earlier work of Ritter (1991) for the 
United States there have been numerous empirical studies for other countries that support the 
view that, on average, IPOs underperform an appropriate benchmark in the long-run 
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(Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist, 1994). Interestingly, the magnitude of these return patterns is 
very similar to that of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs).  
 An earlier study of the long-run performance of initial public offerings for the United 
States by Ritter (1991) revealed first positive but then evenly increasing negative abnormal 
returns for the first three years following an IPO. The analysis of 1,254 IPOs for the period 
from 1975 to 1984 resulted in substantial negative abnormal returns of -29.1% for the 36-
months period after the IPO. A very interesting aspect is that this figure is very similar to the 
one for the long-run performance (36 months) of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). These 
empirical results for IPOs were confirmed in a number of studies for the United States and are 
summarized in Table Ia and Table Ib. With the exception of Chalk and Peavy (1987), all other 
studies find negative abnormal returns independent of the calculation method (CARs, WR). 
This predominantly negative long-run return pattern may suggest that investors are too 
optimistic about the long-run prospect of the firms and are getting more realistic through time. 
It is also possible that IPOs are fairly priced in the primary market but are overpriced on the 
first day of trading in the secondary market. This would mean that when taking the offer price 
as a starting point the IPOs are overpriced in the secondary market and are correctly valued in 
the long-run. Thus, the explanation of the long-run underpricing would turn into a short-term 
overpricing story. 
 Thus, raising new equity either in the primary or secondary market usually leads to 
long-run underperformance suggesting information asymmetry or agency problems. Because 
these are average results we need to be aware that some firms outperform an appropriate 
benchmark substantially but that some other firms significantly underperform. One of the 
interesting issues for empirical research is to determine the factors that may explain which 
firms will underperform and which ones will overperform.  
 Although the time period available to study IPOs in Germany is limited and the number 
of IPOs is relatively small there have been a number of recent studies that analyze the long-run 
performance of IPOs. A detailed review of these studies confirms that the results are very 
sensitive to both the methodology and the benchmark employed. The results of these studies 
are summarized in Table II. Most of these studies find negative long-run abnormal returns. The 
magnitude ranges from -28.0% (Schuster, 1995) and -12.1% (Ljungqvist, 1997) to numbers that 
are close to zero or positive (Stehle et al., 2000), and even yielding only positive returns of 
16.1% (Stehle et al., 2000) for the very early time period from 1960 to 1987. The significant 
differences in Stehle et al. (2000) are due to employing either a value-weighted or equally-
weighted index. Some other differences are due to the time period investigated and the 
methodology used. It is not surprising that the largest negative returns are found when CARs 
are used (Schuster, 1995).  
 Although there is not sufficient evidence yet in the literature to conclude that the 
subsequent financing decisions are the main explanatory factor for the performance, there is 
some empirical evidence that suggests some measurable impact on the long-run performance 
(see for the U.S. Kale and Payne, 2000; Michaely and Shaw, 1994 and for Germany 
Ljungqvist, 1997; Thies, 2000). Overall these empirical findings leave some interesting 
research questions unanswered. Hence, the objective of this study is to investigate the long-run 
abnormal return behavior for the German capital market in greater detail, especially to analyze 
the importance of the subsequent financing decisions. Thus, this research extents the current 
literature in various dimensions.  
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 Some important and interesting research issues that cannot be addressed in this study on 
German IPOs are the difference in performance of venture-backed versus non-venture backed 
IPOs (Brav and Gompers, 1997), the impact of the ownership structure with respect to the first 
SEOs after an IPO, as well as the relationship between operating performance and stock price 
performance for IPOs (Loughran and Ritter, 1997). The major reason for these difficulties is 
that the necessary data is either not available or not reliable for the German firms investigated 
in this study for the period 1977-1995. Because there was no appropriate exit route for early 
stage private equity investors, venture capital did not play a major role before the opening of 
the “Neuer Markt” in 1997. Moreover, some of the firms that went public in this period cannot 
be considered as start-up companies. Giving the traditional German accounting standards, the 
information content of balance sheet and income statement information has to be carefully 
interpreted and moreover is not readily available. However, the relationship between the 
magnitude of the underpricing and subsequent seasoned equity offerings is addressed in this 
empirical study as much as possible. 
 
III. Methodology and Data 
 The two most important aspects in determining whether a stock underperformed or 
outperformed are first to select the appropriate methodology to calculate abnormal returns and 
second to compare these results to an appropriate benchmark for that firm. Thus, differences in 
empirical findings can often be explained either by the methodological approach taken in 
calculating abnormal returns or by the difference in the benchmark employed for comparing 
returns. With respect to the methodology we calculate “buy-and-hold abnormal returns” 
(BHAR) and compare these to the DAX index and to a variety of other benchmarks. In a large 
number of empirical IPO studies BHAR are employed as the appropriate measure for the 
performance over longer periods (Ritter, 1991; Conrad and Kaul, 1993). For comparison 
reasons we also report the results of the traditional method of “cumulative abnormal returns” 
(CAR) in some instances. More recently, the Fama and French (1992) three factor model has 
become quite popular in empirical studies for the United States and other countries. The idea is 
that the additional factors size and book-to-market may be able to better explain stock returns. 
However, there is no theoretical foundation for these factors yet. Moreover, a number of studies 
have indicated the limitation of this approach (Barber and Lyon, 1997; Brav, 2000). In a study 
of IPOs at the “Neuer Markt” in Germany Bessler and Kurth (2007) find only marginal 
evidence for these factors. In addition, Khurshed et al. (2004) provide evidence for IPOs in the 
U.K. that long-run returns are not that different under BHAR and the Fama and French 
approach. Jeanneret (2005) provides similar empirical evidence for SEOs in France. In our 
approach the various factors are accounted for by using different indices. Thus, in order to keep 
the model as simple as possible and comparable to other studies, we calculate standard buy-
and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR).  
 The other important issue is to choose the appropriate benchmark. As Ritter (1991) 
remarks: “the quantitative measurement of the long-run performance of initial public offerings 
is very sensitive to the benchmark employed”. However, for evaluating the long-run 
performance of IPOs it is not clear at all what constitutes the appropriate benchmark portfolio. 
We therefore employ various benchmarks and present our findings for all benchmarks in 
graphical form. We restrict our presentation in the tables in most cases to the abnormal returns 
relative to the DAX, the major German stock market index, unless there are major differences 
in results. 
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 A. Methodology 
 The holding period returns (BHR) for a single stock for period T are calculated as 
follows: 
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where Ri,t  is the return of stock i at time t, and T is the time period for which the BHR is 
determined. For an equally-weighted portfolio of stocks the returns are calculated as: 
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where dBHRP, T is the average BHR of the portfolio, N is the number of stocks in the portfolio, 
and T is the time period for which the BHR is calculated. In order to calculate the abnormal 
returns for the portfolio, the “Buy-and-Hold-Abnormal-Returns” (BHAR), the return of the 
benchmark is subtracted from the return of the IPO. 
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The advantage of this method is that the terminal values of the two strategies, i.e., investing in 
an IPO or investing in the benchmark, are directly comparable. This number is equal to the 
measure of “Wealth Relative” (WR) as proposed by Ritter (1991). The Wealth Relative (WR) 
of a stock is defined as  
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where Ri,t and RM,t are the holding-period-returns for the time period T for the stock i and for 
the market (benchmark), respectively. A WR larger than 1 means overperformance, i.e., the 
performance of the IPO is superior to that of the benchmark, and a WR smaller than 1 suggests 
underperformance of the IPO. For a portfolio of IPOs the appropriate measure is calculated as 
the sum of the performance of the individual firms. Since both approaches provide similar 
results we calculate and report BHAR in this paper.  
 To further underscore the statistical significance of our results we alternatively check 
whether the number of firms with positive excess returns is larger than the number of firms 
with negative excess returns. We conduct a sign test as follows: 
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where x is the % positive abnormal returns divided by 100 and N is the number of analyzed 
events. We test p=0.5. 
 
 B.  Data 
 Over the period from 1977 to 1995 there were 257 companies that went public in the 
German market and were listed on one of the German stock exchanges. The beginning date is 
determined by the fact that there were hardly any IPOs in Germany before that date. The 
ending date of the sample period is determined by the restricting nature of long-term studies 
with subsequent financing activities. To be included in the sample the firms needed to be traded 
in the secondary market for at least 12 months. The sample includes private and public 
offerings, privatizations, spin-offs, and mergers. Overall we have a sample of 218 IPOs that 
meet our selection criteria, which therefore form the sample for our empirical study. The 
number of Initial Public Offerings for each year in the sample is shown in Figure 1. 
 The BHAR are usually calculated for a period of 36 months (M [1, 36]). As the main 
benchmark we employ the DAX, which is a value-weighted blue chip index including 30 
German firms. The other indices employed are the DAFOX-VW, a value-weighted research 
index, the DAFOX-SC-EW, an equally-weighted small cap research index, and the DAFOX-
SC-VW, a value-weighted small cap research index. Firms that went public after 1997 on the 
“Neuer Markt”, the new market for growth firms, had to be excluded from this study because 
this is a different market segment and therefore not directly comparable. In addition it was 
closed in 2003 due to some problems. A detailed analysis of the “Neuer Markt” is provided in 
Kurth (2005) and Bessler and Kurth (2007). The impact of hot and cold issue markets is studied 
in Bessler and Kurth (2005) in this journal. 
 Our empirical results are presented in table-form showing the abnormal returns over 
certain time periods and for specific sub-groups of the sample. Moreover, we present the 
median and the percentages of positive and negative abnormal returns as well as the t- and z-
statistics. In addition, we graphically present the abnormal returns through time so that the 
return pattern of initial public offerings can be analyzed in greater detail. In these graphs it 
becomes especially evident during which time periods the BHAR are positive or negative and 
when the various time series move together or start to diverge. This is especially important for 
the typical return pattern for financing decisions. For example, for IPOs the abnormal returns 
are usually first positive and then turn negative. It is especially important to observe for which 
periods these returns move together and when their performances diverge.  
 
IV. Empirical Results 
 The primary objective of the empirical analysis is to provide additional insights into the 
factors that determine the long-run stock price performance of IPOs in Germany. In particular, 
we investigate whether subsequent financing activities in the equity market may help to explain 
which firms are likely either to outperform or to underperform the benchmark in the long run. 
Thus, we want to determine whether financing decisions after the IPO are a significant factor in 
explaining why some firms have positive and others have negative abnormal returns. In 
addition it is of interest to control for the effects that may arise from the benchmark employed 
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as well as the importance of the underpricing at the time of the IPO. We approach these 
problems by differentiating the abnormal return patterns by the following five criteria: 
 
1) impact of the benchmark, 
2) importance of initial returns, i.e., magnitude of the underpricing,  
3) subsequent first seasoned equity offering (FSEO) and long-run 
performance,  
4) additional financing activities of former IPOs (e.g., FSEOs, 
SSEOs) and long-run performance, and  
5) comparison of the long-run performance of FSEOs of former IPOs 
and SEOs of established firms. 
 
 In short, we first investigate the raw returns with respect to various benchmarks and 
with respect to the magnitude of the underpricing. Most importantly, however, we examine the 
performance of those IPOs that had a seasoned equity offering within the first five years after 
the IPO (FSEO) and compare the performance relative to those firms that had no subsequent 
equity offering. In addition, the performance of IPOs is compared to the long-run performance 
of established firms that had SEOs. We are especially interested in the performance during the 
pre- and post-announcement period of the FSEO and SEO. Before we investigate each of these 
aspects separately in the rest of this section we will first present and analyze the return structure 
of the IPOs. 
 
 A. Return Structure of IPOs 
 The starting point of our empirical study of IPO stock returns is the analysis of raw 
returns, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for 
the full sample of 218 IPOs over a 36-months period. As is documented in Figure 2a, the raw 
returns are positive and sum up to about 20% over the 3-year period. Adjusting for the market 
performance as proxied by the DAX-Index for the market portfolio, however, results in a long-
run negative abnormal performance as is indicated by both measures (CAR and BHAR). It is 
also evident that the cumulative abnormal returns are first positive and then turn negative later 
on. Specifically, the average abnormal returns are positive for up to 15 months after the IPO but 
then turn negative resulting in negative BHAR of -12.7% after 36 months (vs. DAX). This 
outcome for German IPOs is consistent with most findings for other countries (Loughran et al., 
1994).  
 In order to gain additional insights into the IPO performance we conduct additional 
statistical tests. The results are presented in Table III. The number of firms that underperform 
the benchmark is always larger than the ones that outperform the index independent of the 
length of the time interval studied. The percentages increase from 56% to a significant 60% and 
61% for the time periods of 12, 24, and 36 months, respectively. It appears that after 36 months 
the returns of the extreme positive (272%) and negative (-223%) performers relative to the 
benchmark are about at equal distance from the statistical significant mean of -12.7%. In 
addition, about 2/3 (one standard deviation) of the firms in the sample have 36-months returns 
in the range between -88% and 62%. This indicates that a focus on the average return and 
performance needs to be supplemented by additional measures. Moreover, the wide range of 
positive and negative outcomes increases the standard deviation drastically and consequently 
may lead to insignificant results from a statistical point of view. Nevertheless, there is sufficient 
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evidence from the analysis of this sample so far to conclude that the average performance over 
the first three-year-period after going public is increasingly negative relative to the market or 
benchmark. 
 
 B. Benchmark 
 Raw returns are usually not sufficient for measuring over- or underperformance of an 
IPO. Any comparison with respect to risk and return usually requires an appropriate 
benchmark. Adjusting the returns of an individual security to the returns of similar firms with 
respect to size, industry, timing of an IPO, etc. is critical. However, for practical purposes and 
especially for an empirical study it is not immediately obvious what constitutes the appropriate 
benchmark for a particular IPO. Nevertheless, adjusting with an appropriate benchmark is 
crucial in that it often determines whether there are positive or negative abnormal returns. In 
order to obtain a better understanding of the magnitude of the problem for our sample we use 
various market indices or benchmarks for adjusting the raw returns. It should be noted, 
however, that we use either one or the other index for the entire sample and do not make a 
judgment on an individual firm level which index is the appropriate benchmark for that 
particular firm. The indices were already described in section 3.2. The empirical results are 
presented in Figure 2b. 
 The BHAR adjusted by the DAX, DAFOX-VW and the DAFOX-SC-EW lead to 
relatively similar results except for the DAFOX-SC-VW. During the first month this latter 
index provides positive abnormal returns and then fluctuates around zero. These findings are in 
line with the results of other studies (Stehle et al., 2000), whereas all other indices show a 
negative performance. One possible explanation for this result is that a small number of larger 
firms in the sample have positive abnormal returns, thus heavily biasing the BHAR of the 
value-weighted index upwards. In contrast, the DAX provides eventually the most negative 
outcome, indicating that a large firm value-weighted index may introduce some problems when 
valuing IPOs. For the following analysis we have employed all different indices. However, we 
will report only the results of the DAX, DAFOX-SC-EW, and DAFOX-SC-VW index, unless 
the results are different and offer additional insights. 
 
 C. Magnitude of Initial Returns or Underpricing 
 It is quite plausible that the long-run performance of an IPO is influenced by the 
magnitude of the first day return or initial return, i.e. by the underpricing of the IPO. It could be 
argued that the firms with the highest first day returns may have a more negative performance 
afterwards if the price on the first trading day was, for whatever reason, too high relative to the 
offer price. In contrast, firms with low initial returns, i.e., a relatively low price on the fist day 
of trading in relation to the offer price, may experience smaller negative abnormal returns 
thereafter. This behavior may be due to the “hot issue” phenomenon that was observed for the 
United States (Ritter, 1984) and other countries. In a hot issue market the stock prices and the 
number of IPOs increase simultaneously and dramatically. A hot issue period was clearly 
observable for the “Neuer Markt” in Germany from 1998 to 2000 (Bessler and Kurth 2006). 
Nevertheless, for the duration of our observation period, this phenomenon could not be 
confirmed in previous studies (Schuster, 1995).  
 Our empirical results are to some extent mixed. On the one hand, they indicate 
that firms with smaller initial returns have subsequently more negative returns, i.e., the 
smaller first day returns may have been a signal of the poor quality of the IPO. As 
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indicated in Table IV, IPOs with an initial return lower than 1% show a statistically 
significant BHAR of -14.8%, with a median of -35.8%. On the other hand, the results 
for the IPOs with the highest initial return of greater than 12% indicate a subsequent 
negative performance of -13.3%. This suggests that these firms may have been 
overpriced on the first day of trading in the secondary market, supporting the “hot 
issue” argument. The return pattern is graphed in Figure 3. It is important to note that 
firms with the highest initial return (> 12%) and run-up in the first 15 months of trading 
show a sharp decline over the next 15 months. Within this group, however, more than 
55% of firms return to the market to raise additional equity (FSEOs) as shown in Table 
V. 
 This observation could indicate that companies use the initial return, i.e. the larger 
underpricing, as a signal for the firm’s quality. There exists empirical evidence that firms with 
a larger underpricing or run-up over the following months return to the market more often to 
raise additional equity. We call such an SEO that follows an IPO a “First Seasond Equity 
Offering” or FSEO. When separating the sample into IPOs with FSEOs and IPOs without 
subsequent equity financing the performance results become even more pronounced. The 
sample of firms that do not return to the equity market for additional funds show an 
increasingly negative performance as presented in Figure 4b. It should be noted, however, that 
the results are fairly stable in that at least 72% of the firms in all classes have negative 
abnormal returns as shown in Table VI. In addition the median is in all classes much more 
negative than the BHAR, which is in all classes statistically significant.  
 In contrast, the performance of the IPOs that have additional equity offerings (FSEO) in 
the secondary market is on average positive as presented in Figure 4a. Thus, they outperform 
the IPOs without FSEOs. Because the IPOs with the highest initial returns have the best 
performance for the short-run, it appears that there is a relationship between underpricing and 
long-run performance. Nevertheless, the IPOs with the highest initial returns have also the 
worst performance after one year. Therefore, the results suggest that overall the underpricing 
does not add much to explain the long-run performance of firms that went public in Germany.  
However, these results could indicate that the investors cannot distinguish between the good 
and bad performers at the time of the IPO. In this case the management has the opportunity to 
exploit their information advantage. This means that the managers of an IPO are able to exploit 
these “windows of opportunities” and time the subsequent equity offering successfully. 
Consequently, they issue equity when the firm is overvalued and before the capital market can 
fully assess the correct quality of the firm and re-prices the stock. The negative long-run 
performance can also be explained with Jensen’s free-cash-flow hypothesis, i.e., the additional 
cash inflow from issuing equity creates new agency problems. In this case the management 
does not invest the additional funds as expected by the investors. As a result, the present value 
of the expected cash inflows needs to be re-priced, thus leading to a lower stock price. 
 The differentiation between IPOs with FSEO and IPOS without FSEO is stable because 
the t-value for the means per group is significant, independent of the initial return in both 
subgroups as is presented in Table VII. However, we do not have a clear indication for a "hot 
issue" phenomenon in the German market for that period. 
 
 D. Subsequent First Seasoned Equity Offerings (FSEO) 
 One of the most important factors that may impact the long-run performance of an IPO 
is whether the IPO firms have the opportunity and eventually will return to the capital market to 
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raise additional equity. Obviously, this information is not available at the time of the IPO but 
only in hindsight. In fact the decision to issue more equity may depend on the performance of 
the IPO itself. It can be expected that successful firms have a superior chance to return to the 
equity market for additional funds whereas this opportunities for the below average performers 
may be slim. The expected operating performance should be reflected in the current stock price. 
It is important to note that cause and effect of this relationship needs to be carefully analyzed 
before any meaningful conclusion can be drawn. This is, however, beyond the scope of this 
paper because detailed and reliable accounting information is not available for German firms 
over that time period. Nevertheless, our results suggest that firms that have a seasoned equity 
offering within the first five years after the IPO have on average positive raw returns as well as 
positive market adjusted returns. This performance is documented in Figure 5a.  
 Analyzing the abnormal returns and the percentages of positive and negative returns 
also provides some interesting insights as shown in Table VIIIa. Overall the abnormal returns 
are positive with the highest return of 16.2% relative to the DAX (M[1, 36]). This figure is 
significant at the 5%-level. In contrast, for the firms that either did not plan or that did not have 
the opportunity to return to the equity market a substantial underperformance is documented. 
The values are graphed in Figure 5b.First of all, the average raw returns fluctuate around zero. 
Second, when adjusting with a benchmark we observe significant negative BHAR independent 
of the index employed. The BHAR of -37.6% (vs. DAX) for the first 36 months of trading is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The median of -46.9% also supports this observation. 
The conclusion of extreme negative abnormal returns and underperformance is supported 
further by the high and significant percentage of firms with negative BHAR of at least 65% vs. 
DAX and DAFOX as shown with more detailed values in Table VIIIb. 
 In addition, the results presented in Table IX underscore the robustness of this 
separation of our initial sample. The difference in means of both subgroups is statistically 
significant independent of the benchmark used. In sum, subsequent equity financing is an 
important factor explaining the long-run performance of IPOs. Thus, differentiating the sample 
into firms for which the IPO was the only time that they raised equity in the financial markets 
and the ones that had a subsequent SEO yield some important insights and helps to explain the 
long-run performance of IPOs. This interesting aspect and important observation is further 
investigated in more detail in the next section.  
 
E. Performance of IPOs with Seasoned Equity Offerings 
 The results so far support the notion that firms that return to the equity market after 
going public to raise additional equity through a “First Seasoned Equity Offering” (FSEO) 
show some superior performance relative to the firms that do not return to the equity market. 
Given the additional empirical evidence that the long-run performance of seasoned equity 
offerings (SEOs) is negative after the SEO, it is interesting to analyze how these IPOs perform 
in the time period before and after they issue additional equity. The raw returns and adjusted 
returns over the 12-months pre-announcement period as well as over the 36-months post-
announcement period following the FSEO are presented in Figure 6a. The results suggest that 
firms that return to the market have on average a superior performance or run-up up to the time 
of the FSEO. On average, however, they do not generate higher raw returns after the FSEO. 
Instead the empirical results reveal the typical return behavior of underperformance against the 
benchmark after a SEO.  
Initial Public Offerings, Subsequent Seasoned Equity Offerings…(Bessler and Thies) 
 
14 
 The run-up or over-performance of 16.5% for the period of twelve months before the 
SEO is statistically significant as presented in Table X. There is also a statistically significant 
underperformance of -24.8% in the 36-months period after the FSEO. The percentage of 
negative returns in the pre-announcement period of 31.2% and the percentage of negative 
returns of 77.0% in the 36-months period after the SEO are highly significant. These results 
suggest that the management tried to time the market and issued additional equity when the 
firm was overvalued. This observation and interpretation is consistent with most of the 
empirical findings reported in the literature. For SEOs the empirical studies usually find 
positive abnormal returns in the pre-announcement period and negative abnormal returns in the 
post-announcement period.  
 It appears that these firms are able to use their superior information with respect to the 
value of the firm to exploit “windows of opportunity”, i.e., issuing equity when the firm is 
overvalued. This view is supported by analyzing the abnormal returns over the entire period 
around the first seasoned equity offering (FSEO). The performance over the four year period 
(M [-12, 36]), i.e., one year before and three years after the SEO, show negative abnormal 
returns of -9.1%. This means that the relative firm value (share price) declined over that period. 
Thus, shareholder value has been destroyed. It appears that the capital market is not able to 
determine the fair value of the firm before the FSEO (Gale and Stiglitz, 1989). Another 
explanation is that the money is invested in poor projects or wasted for other reasons (Jensen, 
1986). Moreover, the investors appear to be too optimistic when investing in these shares and 
consequently realize negative returns in the long-run.   
 The importance of subsequent equity financing is further investigated by separating this 
sample of IPOs with FSEOs into those firms that did raise only once equity in the secondary 
market (FSEO) and those firms that returned to the equity market at least a second time for 
raising additional funds (SSEO). This separation yields additional insights as presented in 
Figure 6b. The portfolio of firms that did not raise more equity after the “First Seasoned Equity 
Offering” (FSEO) show on average an underperformance of -31.0% over the four year time 
interval (M [-12, 36]) surrounding the event. The negative abnormal return is significant at the 
5% level. This result is in contrast to those firms that issue additional shares (SSEO). The 
abnormal returns of the portfolio of firms that have a “Second Seasoned Equity Offering” 
(SSEO) after the IPO outperform the benchmarks and have on average positive abnormal 
returns of 11.7% over the four year time interval (M [-12, 36]). The difference of means 
between these two groups of firms is significant at the 5% level (t= 2.24).  
 It appears that there exists a substantial difference in performance between these two 
portfolios. The interesting question is, however, whether the investor can distinguish between 
these two groups beforehand. The performance of the two groups is such that the issuing firms 
have a run-up in the period before the SSEO (M [-12, 0]) of 17.5%, whereas the non-issuing 
group has a run-up of 15.4%. These results suggest that the investor can hardly predict the 
future performance of firms after the first seasoned equity offering (FSEO) and therefore 
cannot successfully distinguish between the high and low quality firms. This finding is 
consistent with the empirical evidence in previous studies. However, it is possible that the 
underperformance of the issuing firms is not related to the past performance or that it is not a 
possible miss-pricing of the market. Instead, the poor performance following the SSEO is the 
result of agency problems in the sense of the free-cash-flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) that 
becomes evident only after the SSEO. For example, the equity raised may have been invested 
in poor projects that do not generate the cost of capital or were wasted otherwise. In this case 
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the realized return was below the investors’ expected rate of return. Consequently, it is no 
surprise that the stock price underperforms after the SSEO.     
 The empirical evidence so far suggests that firms return to the market as long as they 
are perceived by the investors as successful, but that the market is not interested in those firms 
that did not generate a superior performance on the funds raised in the IPO or the last SEO. 
Thus, it is of no surprise that the average long-run performance for both IPOs and FSEOs 
without further equity financing is negative when compared to the appropriate benchmark. 
 The abnormal returns over the three year time interval (M [1, 36]) for the firms with 
additional equity financing after the FSEO, i.e. SSEO, and the firms with no additional SEO 
after the FSEO are presented and compared in Table XI. Although the performance of firms 
with a second seasoned equity offering (SSEO) is on average negative (-11.3%) in the post 
issuing period, the results are not significantly different from zero. In contrast, the firms that 
did not raise additional equity after the FSEO have a negative performance of -39.1%, which is 
significant at the 1% level. In this case the performance of the portfolio relative to each other 
may offer additional insights. When comparing the average performance of both portfolios it is 
evident that the mean returns are significantly different at the 5% level (t = 2.0). Moreover, the 
substantial difference between these two portfolios is further supported in that nearly 90% of 
the firms with SSEOs have a negative performance afterwards. This is significant at the 1% 
level. In sum, the equity financing opportunity of firms after the IPO is a factor that helps to 
explain the long-run outperformance and underperformance of IPOs. 
 
 F. Performance of First Seasoned Equity Offerings of former IPOs compared 
to SEOs of established firms 
 The portfolio of IPOs that raised additional equity at least one more time after the IPO 
yields on average a negative return of -9.1% over the time interval M [-12, 36] (see table X). 
The empirical result so far supports the view that information asymmetry and agency problems 
are important aspects in financing decisions. It could also be interpreted as evidence that the 
information asymmetry of firms that went public is more pronounced relative to established 
firms. In order to investigate this preposition that there is more uncertainty in valuing IPOs than 
in valuing established firms, i.e. there is more information asymmetry, we compare the 
performance of IPOs and established firms around the time when they issue additional equity 
through a “Seasoned Equity Offering” (SEO). The long-run performance of established firms 
with SEOs that have at least one additional equity offering (SSEO) over the next five years and 
the performance of IPOs with FSEOs and additional equity offerings (SSEO) are presented in 
Figure 7a.  
 In contrast, Figure 7b shows the performance of IPOs and established firms that issued 
equity in the secondary market (FSEO and SEO, respectively) only once but then had no 
additional SEO.The portfolios of former IPOs (FSEO) have a stronger run-up in the period 
before the SSEO than the portfolio of established firms. This observation holds for both cases, 
i.e., whether or not the IPOs and the established firms have further SEOs within the next five 
years. After the second seasoned equity offering (SSEO), however, the IPOs have the inferior 
abnormal performance. In other words, the established firms outperform the IPOs in both cases 
after adjusting with the appropriate benchmarks. The empirical results for the run-up period 
(M [-12, 0]), the long-run performance after the SSEO (M [1, 36]), and the performance for the 
entire 4 year time interval (M [-12, 36]) are summarized in Table XII. 
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 The empirical findings seem to indicate that the information asymmetry is more 
pronounced for IPOs than for established firms because the run-up (15.4% vs. 9.1%), the long-
run performance (-31.0% vs. -19.4%) as well as the percentage of negative returns (80.0% vs. 
62.0%) suggest less risk for the established firms. It is also possible that agency problems in the 
form of the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) or a change in the ownership structure are 
more important valuation factors for IPOs than for established firms. It is important to note that 
the difference in means for the long-run performance (M[1, 36]) between the portfolio of IPOs 
with subsequent equity offerings and the portfolio of established firms with subsequent equity 
offerings is statistically significant at the 5% level (t = 2.32). In contrast, the difference in the 
means for the portfolios without subsequent equity financing is insignificant.  
 The observation and conclusion of this study that the management of IPO firms tends to 
exploit the investors’ uncertainty or information disadvantage seem to be supported by the 
more recent observations for the “Neuer Markt”, the former German market for start-up 
companies. Although these firms are not directly comparable with the firms in this study, it 
appears that a number of firms tried to exploit the information advantage and overvaluation 
(hot issue market of 1998 - 2000) by issuing additional equity (FSEO) as soon as possible after 
the IPO. This could be explained with a different financing behavior through time (stage-
financing). However, it is more likely that firms are able to time the market, that the long-run 
performance is negative because the predictions of the expected growth rates are usually too 
optimistic, and that in the long-run only the high quality firms will be able to raise additional 
equity. It could be expected that the results of a similar study for the IPOs of the “Neuer Markt” 
will even be more dramatic because the information asymmetry should be more pronounced for 
these firms due to the shorter company history. 
 
V. Conclusions 
 The objective of this study was to investigate the importance of the subsequent 
financing decisions for the long-run performance of initial public offerings in Germany for the 
period from 1977 to 1995. It was of particular interest to examine whether underpricing and 
subsequent financing decisions can help to explain why some firms have substantial positive 
and others substantial negative long-run abnormal holding period returns after they go public. 
The subsequent financing activity in the equity market, i.e., whether the firm that went public 
had one (FSEO) or more seasoned equity offering (SSEO) after the IPO, appears to be the 
criterion that eventually separates the outperformers from the underperformers. Thus, the 
empirical findings of this research suggest that one of the most important factors that determine 
the direction and the magnitude of the abnormal returns or performance are the financing 
opportunities in subsequent years.  
 The empirical evidence, however, does not imply any cause-and-effect-relationship of 
this phenomenon yet. At a first glance these results suggest that firms with a better stock price 
performance have the opportunity to raise additional equity whereas the poor performers do not 
get an immediate second chance to sell equity to the public. Management usually exploits this 
opportunity as soon as possible. Obviously, this insight from hindsight does not offer any 
guidance beforehand which firms will have the superior performance. It is also an interesting 
question whether the run-up before the SEO is the reason for the equity offering or whether the 
planned SEO is the reason for the run-up. The results also indicate that in general firms seem to 
be in a position to optimally time their financing activities. Management appears to use their 
information advantage with respect to the fair value of the firm to exploit “windows of 
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opportunities”. These findings are robust with respect to the benchmark employed. Moreover, 
the information asymmetry appears to be more pronounced for IPOs than for established firms 
in that they have a stronger stock price reaction in both the pre- and post-announcement periods 
of a seasoned equity offering. 
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Table I a/b 
Short-Run and Long-Run Performance of IPOs in the U.S. 
 
 
 
 
a) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
Study N CAR Interval Period Adjustment 
Chalk/Peavy (1987) 649 18.0% D [1, 190] 1975 – 1982 Market 
Aggarwal/Rivoli (1990) 1,598 -13.7% D [1, 250] 1977 – 1987 NASDAQ, D/M 
Ritter (1991) 1,254 -29.1% M [1, 36] 1975 – 1984 “Matching Firm” 
Affleck-Graves et al. (1996) 2,096 -7.6% D [1, 504] 1975 – 1991 “Size-Matched” 
Carter et al. (1998) 2,292 -19.9% D [6, 765] 1979 – 1984 VW-CRSP-Index 
D: Days, M: Month, D/M: Dimson/Marsh (1986), VW-CRSP-Index: value-weighted-Index 
Source: Chalk/Peavy (1987, Table 1, p. 66), Aggarwal/Rivoli (1990, Exhibit 2, p. 49), Ritter (1991, 
Table II, p. 10), Affleck-Graves et al. (1996, Table 3, p. 32), Carter et al. (1998, p. 288). 
 
 
b) Wealth Relatives (WR) 
Study N WR Interval Period Adjustment 
Ritter (1991) 1,526 0.83 (34.5/61.9) D [1, 756] 1975 – 1984 „Size Adjusted“ 
Loughran (1993) 3,656 0.67 (17.3/76.2) M [0, 72] 1967 – 1987 NASDAQ-EW 
Loughran/Ritter 
(1995) 
4,753 0.80   (8.4/35.3) 
0.70 (15.7/66.4) 
D [1, 756] 
D [1, 1260] 
1970 – 1990 BHAR, EW-PF 
 
EW-PF: equally-weighted Portfolio 
Source:  Ritter (1991, Table 3, p. 14), Loughran (1993, Table 3, p. 250), Loughran/Ritter  (1995, 
Table II, p. 31 and p. 37 f.). 
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Table II 
Long-Run Performance of IPOs in Germany 
 
 
Study N AR Period Interval Adjustment 
Schuster (1995) 59 -28.0% 1988 – 1992 M [0, 60] FAZ, CAR 
Ljungqvist (1997) 154 
145 
-19.9% 
-12.1% 
1970 – 1990 D [1, 750] DAFOX, WR 
DAFOX, WR, o. PFM 
Ljungqvist (1997) 88 -1.8% 1970 – 1987 D [1, 750] DAFOX, WR, o. PFM 
Stehle et al. (2000) 95 
92 
16.1% 
-13.5% 
1960 – 1987 
1988 – 1992 
M [0, 36] EW-MP, WD 
Stehle et al. (2000) 95 
92 
-1.1% 
-9.0% 
1960 – 1987 
1988 – 1992 
M [0, 36] VW-MP, WD 
Stehle et al. (2000) 95 
92 
-5.4% 
-7.9% 
1960 – 1987 
1988 – 1992 
M [0, 36] GG-PF by size, WD 
Thies (2000) 218 -12.7% 1977 – 1995 M [1, 36] VW-MP, BHAR 
D: Days, M: Month, Index StBundesamt: Index of the Statistisches Bundesamtes, D/M = Dimson/ Marsh 
(1986), FFJR = Fama et al. (1969), WR = „Wealth Relative“, WD = „Wealth Difference“, o. PFM: 
without IPOs underwritten by Portfolio Management GmbH. 
Source: Schuster (1995, Table 3, p. 11), Ljungqvist (1997, Table 1, p. 1312), Stehle et al. (2000, p. 
178), Thies (2000, p. 376). 
 
 
Table III 
Long-Run Performance of IPOs in Germany (N = 218, DAX) 
 
 
Interval BHAR t-stat. Median STD MIN MAX % Neg.   z-stat. 
M [1, 12] 2.1%  0.90 -2.9% 35.2% -67% 68% 56% -1.70* 
M [1, 24] -3.1% -0.79 -8.4% 57.5% -129% 179% 60% -2.89** 
M [1, 36] -12.7% -2.50** -17.2% 75.0% -223% 272% 61% -3.18*** 
***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
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Table IV 
Initial Return (IR) and Long-Run Performance M [1, 36] 
 
 
Initial Return in % N BHAR t-stat. Median STD % Neg. z-stat. 
Total group 203 -10.6% -1.98** -15.9% 75.9% 59.6% -2.67*** 
IR < 1% 47 -14.8% -1.04 -35.8% 96.7% 65.6% -2.04** 
1% < IR < 4,9% 55 -9.5% -1.03 -10.8% 67.5% 58.2% -1.08 
5% < IR < 11,9% 45 -4.2% -0.38 -11.7% 73.8% 53.3% -0.30 
IR > 12% 56 -13.3% -1.49 -15.2% 66.6% 60.7% -1.47 
***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
 
 
 
 
Table V 
Initial Return and Percentage of IPOs with FSEOs 
 
Criteria Initial Return in % 
IR < 1% 1% < IR < 4.9% 5% < IR < 11.9% IR > 12% 
without FSEOs (%) 27 (57.4%) 36 (65.5%) 25 (55.6%) 25 (44.6%) 
with FSEOs (%) 20 (42.6%) 19 (34.5%) 20 (44.4%) 31 (55.4%) 
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Table VI 
Initial Return and Long-Run Performance of IPOs  
with/without FSEOs (Benchmark: DAX) 
 
 
Initial return in % N BHAR t-stat. Median STD % Neg. z-stat. 
with FSEOs 
IR < 1% 20 31.3% 1.36  -12.4% 102.1% 55.0% -0.22 
1% < IR < 4,9% 19 20.3% 1.45   29.6%   56.5% 31.6%  1.83* 
5% < IR < 11,9% 20 42.3% 2.70***   33.5%   70.3% 30.0%  2.01* 
IR > 12% 31   6.1% 0.59   -2.6%   56.5% 51.6%  0.00 
without FSEOs 
IR < 1% 27 -48.9% -3.27*** -65.5% 77.6% 74.1% -2.31** 
1% < IR < 4,9% 36 -26.3% -2.31** -40.1% 68.4% 72.2% -2.50** 
5% < IR < 11,9% 25 -41.4% -3.88*** -46.0% 53.2% 72.0% -2.00** 
IR > 12% 25 -37.3% -2.62*** -52.2% 72.0% 72.0% -2.00** 
***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
 
 
 
Table VII 
Test of Significance for Mean of IPOs with/without FSEO 
 
Criteria 
Sample 
IR < 1% 
 
1% < IR < 4.9% 
 
5% < IR < 11.9% 
 
IR > 12% 
 
without FSEO -48.9% -26.3% -41.4% -37.3% 
with FSEO  31.3%  20.3%  42.3%    6.1% 
t-value        2.93***        2.69***        4.19***      2.46** 
***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
 
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance & Business Ventures, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 
 
27 
 
Table VIII a/b 
Long-Run Performance of IPOs  
with/without First  Seasoned Equity Offerings (FSEOs) 
a)  with First Seasoned Equity Offerings  
Interval N BHAR t-stat. STD MIN MAX % Neg. z-stat. 
DAFOX-SC-EW 
M [1, 12] 101 7.3% 2.07** 35.5%  -58% 158% 48.5%  0.40 
M [1, 24] 101 6.6% 1.24 53.5% -129% 202% 49.5%  0.20 
M [1, 36] 101 8.1% 1.21 67.7% -127% 240% 57.5% -1.41 
DAX 
M [1, 12] 101 11.3% 3.04*** 37.1% -66% 168% 43.6% 1.39 
M [1, 24] 101 13.1% 2.41** 54.6% -96% 207% 44.6% 1.18 
M [1, 36] 101 16.2% 2.23** 72.4% -119% 272% 47.5% 0.60 
***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/ 5% /10% level. 
b) without First Seasoned Equity Offerings 
Interval N BHAR t-stat. STD MIN MAX % Neg. z-stat. 
DAFOX-SC-EW 
M [1, 12] 117 -4.3% -1.45 32.1%  -58% 158% 65.0% -3.15*** 
M [1, 24] 117 -9.8% -1.81 58.5% -129% 202% 70.1% -4.26*** 
M [1, 36] 117 -19.5% -3.61*** 58.4% -127% 240% 75.4% -5.19*** 
DAX 
M [1, 12] 117 -5.7% -1.96** 31.5%   -67% 138% 67.5% -3.69*** 
M [1, 24] 117 -17.0% -3.25*** 56.5% -129% 279% 71.8% -4.62*** 
M [1, 36] 117 -37.6% -5.96*** 68.2% -223% 257% 71.8% -4.62*** 
***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
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Table IX 
Long-Run Performance of IPOs  
with/without FSEO and various Benchmarks 
 
 
Benchmark 
Sample 
DAX DAFOX-SC-VW DAFOX-SC-EW 
IPOs without FSEO   -37.6%*** -11.8%**   -19.7%*** 
Full Sample -12.4%**   4.1% 
NS
 -7.8%* 
IPOs with FSEO  16.2%**   22.5%***    8.1% 
NS
 
Significance of Difference in 
Means (t-value) 
    5.83***    3.81***   4.37*** 
***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10% level, NS denotes non-significant. 
 
 
Table X 
Long-Run Performance of First Seasoned  
Equity Offerings (FSEO) of former IPOs vs. DAX 
 
 
Interval N BHAR t-stat. MIN MAX STD % Neg. z-stat. 
M [-12, 1] 113 16.5%  5.33*** -62% 130% 32.9% 31.2%  4.14*** 
M [1, 12] 113 -3.3% -1.06 -75% 190% 32.9% 64.6% -3.01*** 
M [1, 24] 113 -11.4% -2.63*** -104% 217% 46.1% 71.7% -4.52*** 
M [1, 36] 113 -24.8% -3.56*** -171% 407% 74.1% 77.0% -5.64*** 
M [-12, 36] 113 -9.1% -0.94 -201% 539% 102.2% 64.6% -3.01*** 
For Comparison: Full Sample of SEOs from 1974 - 1995 (N = 877) 
M [-12, 36]   877    3.2%  0.71 -223% 617%   80.9%   35.3% -8,67*** 
***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/ 5% /10% level. 
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Table XI 
Long-Run Performance of FSEO with/without further SSEO for M [1, 36] 
 
 
Criteria N BHAR t-stat. STD MIN. MAX % Neg. z-stat. 
FSEOs without 
further SSEO 
55 
 
-39.1% 3.47*** 83.6% -170% 407% 89.1% -5.66*** 
FSEO with 
further SSEO 
58 -11.3% -1.39 61.5% -150% 212% 65.5% -2.23*   
***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/ 5% /10% level. 
 
 
 
Table XII 
Long-Run Performance of FSEO of former IPOs and  
SEO of established firms (respectively with/without further SSEO) 
 
Criteria Interval N BHAR t-stat STD % Neg. 
FSEO of former IPOs, 
no further SSEO 
M [-12, -1] 
M [1, 36] 
M [-12, 36] 
55 15.4% 
-39.1% 
-31.0% 
 3.61*** 
-3.47*** 
-2.02** 
31.7% 
83.6% 
113.7% 
32.7% 
89.1% 
80.0% 
SEO of established 
firms, no further SSEO 
M [-12, -1] 
M [1, 36] 
M [-12, 36] 
265    9.1% 
-26.2% 
-19.4% 
 4.29*** 
-6.94*** 
-3.48*** 
34.6% 
61.4% 
90.6% 
37.8% 
70.1% 
62.0% 
FSEO of former IPOs, 
further SSEO 
M [-12, -1] 
M [1, 36] 
M [-12, 36] 
58 17.5% 
-11.3% 
11.7% 
 3.91*** 
-0.98 
 1.04 
34.2% 
61.5% 
85.9% 
29.8% 
65.5% 
50.0% 
SEO of established 
firms, further SSEO 
M [-12, -1] 
M [1, 36] 
M [-12, 36] 
356 15.2% 
10.2% 
34.3% 
 6.51*** 
 2.26** 
 4.03*** 
45.1% 
85.2% 
160.2% 
33.0% 
50.2% 
52.5% 
***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
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Figure 1: 
Number of IPOs in Germany in the Sample from 1977 – 1995 (N = 218) 
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Figure 2a: 
Long-Run Performance of IPOs in Germany 1977 - 1995 
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Figure 2b 
Long-Run Performance (BHAR) of IPOs for various Benchmarks 
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Figure 3 
Initial Returns (IR) and Long-Run Performance of IPOs (DAX) 
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Figure 4a 
Initial Return and Long-Run Performance of IPOs with FSEO (DAX) 
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Figure 4b 
Initial Return and Long-Run Performance of IPOs without FSEO (DAX) 
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Figure 5a 
Long-Run Performance of IPOs in Germany with FSEO 
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Figure 5b 
Long-Run Performance of IPOs in Germany without FSEO 
-0,50
-0,40
-0,30
-0,20
-0,10
0,00
0,10
0,20
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35
Raw Return
DAFOX-SC-VW
DAFOX-SC-EW
DAX-VW
 
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance & Business Ventures, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 
 
35 
 
Figure 6a 
Long-Run Performance of FSEO of former IPOs (DAX) 
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Figure 6b 
Long-Run Performance of FSEO of former IPOs  
(with and without SEOs within next 5 years) 
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Figure 7a 
Long-Run Performance of FSEO of former IPOs and SEO of  
established firms (respectively with further SSEO) vs. DAX 
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Figure 7b 
Long-Run Performance of FSEO of former IPOs and SEOs of  
established firms (respectively without further SSEO) vs. DAX 
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